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# The Rise of Memory-Safe Languages: Building a Fast, Elastic, Secure Software & Hardware Architecture Anjo Vahldiek-Oberwagner (Intel Labs)

# Cloud Services waste 25% of Compute

- Monolithic architectures (Google, Facebook, etc.) incur high overheads
- CPU wastes 25% of cycles on preparing communication
- High tail latencies due to dependencies • Moving to logically decomposed services improves:
  - Developer productivity by 10x
  - Isolation of security vulnerabilities  $\bullet$
  - Scaling service elastically with load

Distributed Cloud Service:

Collections of communicating Services



# Vision: Fast, Elastic, Secure Memory-Safe Software & Hardware Architecture

### Key Insight:

Collapse services and protect with memory-safe languages

GeoLocation Reservation	Scheduler	FS Net	_ Memory Boundar
Operating System (OS)	Devices	Discovery	CPU Sec

Optimized Central Processing Unit (CPU)

- Memory-Safe Languages restrict
- Access to service's memory
- Execution to predefined entry points in services
- Eliminates the use of CPU security domains
  - > 20x faster creation
  - > 100x more domains
- Sharing between OS and service is a function call
- No marshalling of complex structures
- No copy to/from service, all memory is shared
- No synchronization via thread migration
- Kernel bypass for remote communication
- Regain 25% of CPU cycles wasted for communication
- Improve tail-latency due to complex synchronization chains

Safety

curity Domain

# Existing architectures cannot simultaneously be fast, elastic and secure

	SFI	MicroVM	multiPI
Execution	20-40% slower	Native	Native
Creation	5 ms	20x slower	<10ms
Domains	10,000	100x fewer	100,000
Switch time	2 ns	> 1,000 ns	<10ns
Security	HW Attacks	Strong	Strong
Sharing	5-10% wasted	25% wasted	instant

Research improving SFI:

- Swivel (USESec'21) → Harden SFI against HW, 5-240% slower UC San Diego
- Hardware Fault Isolation  $\rightarrow$  Special hardware extension Wasm compiler optimizations  $\rightarrow$  10% perf. improvement Research improving MicroVM:
- $\mu$ Switch (IEEE S&P'23)  $\rightarrow$  Faster + avoid unnecessary switches
- LittleMac  $\rightarrow$  Secure, Programmable Isolation + Sharing

# Challenges and Opportunities: Safe & Efficient SW/HW Abstraction with Legacy Support

### Challenge of Memory-Safe Language Security:

- Dependence on trusting the compiler and runtime toolchain
- Research directions:
- Verified compilers and runtimes
- Trusted Hardware support for memory-safe languages
- Trusted supply chain with runtime validation

### Challenge of Legacy Service Support:

- Legacy services are not written in memory-safe languages
- Without legacy support, slow adoption
- Research and Industry directions:
- Wasm as compilation target for many languages
- Memory-safe implementations of important interpreters
- Light-weight hardware technique restricting access to memory regions

### Optimization of a Memory-Safe CPU:

- Memory layout of memory-safe languages is simpler than usual applications
- Statically bind virtual to physical mapping to reduce page miss handler
- Memory address translation in 1 cycle instead of 4, no page miss handler

#### Challenge and Optimization of Secure Sharing between Services: Revocation of sharing not possible in single address space with today's CPU Capability-based Hardware (e.g., CHERI or Cryptographic Computing) • Offer memory permission at sub-page granularity Sharing via forwarding of capabilities instead of pointers

multiPIE lative 10ms 00,000s 10ns

Software-Fault Isolation (SFI) f(x) f(x)f(x) f(x)SFI Runtime Operating System(OS) Hypervisor CPU Boundary

f(x) f(x)OS OS Hypervisor CPU Memory Safety CPU Security Domain

PURDUE

UNIVERSIT

RICE

MicroVM

70% of security vulnerabilities are caused by memory-safety violations.

Memory-Safe Languages prevent violations at compile time



 Ownership Comparable performance

### Single-Process Software Model for all Services

- multiPIE capabilities:
  - modules





### The Rise of Memory-Safe Languages





Virtual Machine 20-40% performance overhead

# multiPIE Approach: Fast, Efficient and Secure Software Runtime



• Supports legacy executables, containers and Wasm

 Loads existing service packages • Multiplexes system resources (e.g., files) • Is written in Rust to statically and automatically validate implementation against safety guarantees • Optimizes interactions between services and OS

• multiPIE is an intermediate layer: Validate sharing abstractions between services • Demonstrate best case performance • Explore limitations of today's CPUs • Evaluate proposed CPU techniques • Offer new software model to industry